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by the Schumacher reasoning, the court's action may possibly repre-
sent a sub silentio repudiation of its earlier construction of Sec. 5385.
Such repudition, it is true, would be unnecessary for the stone crush-
ing concerns themselves, for they had meanwhile found relief in the
legislature. By the 1939 amendment of Sec. 5388, not only they, but
farmers and towel and linen suppliers as well, had gained the 5o%
rate.' 6 This followed by some years similar legislative relief17 from
unfavorable lower court judgment 11 as to the nature of the opera-
tions of laundries and dry cleaners; and preceded by a biennium the
1941 addition of Sec. 5388-5,'" which anticipatorily does the same for
rural electric cooperatives. Indeed, in these repeated legislative ex-
pressions of dissatisfaction with the judicial handling of the problem
may be found the cue to the Supreme Court's present gratuitous
dictun. For, although technically they involve no effort to define as
"manufacturing" the activities of the named businesses, there is mani-
fest in them as a legislative intent that Sec. 5385 enjoy a liberal
interpretation. Very possibly, therefore, it was to avoid the unsatis-
factory alternative of likely continued legislative patch-work that the
court went beyond the requirement of the case before it to put its
decision on a "broader ground," hoping thereby to impute into the
definitional section an acceptable basis for administration of this im-
portant aspect of Ohio's taxation of tangible personalty.
W. C. D.
TREATMENT OF CREDITS UUDER OHIO INTANGIBLE TAX
LAWS-ADVANCE PAYMENTS NOT ACCOUNTS PAYABLE
Taxpayer, a manufacturer of machinery on special order, requires
its customers to advance monies before delivery. In returning its
personal property for Ohio taxation, taxpayer claimed a deduction
of such advances from its "credits" under Ohio Gen. Code Sec. 5327,
the controlling portion of which reads: "The term credits as so
-used, means the excess of the sum of all current accounts receivable
and prepaid items used in business when added together estimating
every such account and item at its true value in money, over and
above the sum of current accounts payable of the business, other
11 118 Ohio Laws 609.17 115 Ohio Laws 564.
13 Laundry and Cleaning Co. v. Tax Comm., 30 N.P. (zi.s.) 25, affd, 14 Ohio L. Abs.
357 (1932).
19 119 Ohio Laws 215.
NOTES AND COMINMENTS
than taxes and assessments. 'Current accounts' include items re-
ceivable or payable on demand or within one year from the date of
inception however evidenced." The Board of Tax Appeals sus-
tained the tax commissioner in denying the deduction. On appeal
under Ohio Gen. Code Sec. 5611-2, held, affirmed, one judge con-
curring and one dissenting. Black-Clawson Co. v. Evatt, 139 Ohio
St. IOO, 38 N. E. (2d) 403 (94).
The majority, declaring the statute so clear as to admit of but
one interpretation, held the advance payments to be outside the legis-
lative authorization for deduction. Their reasoning took the tack
that such advances were not in fact liabilities but only contingent
obligations, inasmuch as the taxpayer would not be obligated to re-
imburse its customers except on failure to deliver the machinery
ordered; consequently, they were not current accounts payable as
statutorily defined. By legal definition, however, such advances from
customer to manufacturer are definite liabilities of the latter;' while
accountants are in substantial agreement that they should be treated
as current liabilities. 2  Justification for this view is evident upon
analysis of the current financial position of any business enterprise.
Current funds--cash, receivables, and inventory-available to satisfy
current obligations, constitute a business's current assets. The ob-
ligations which must be so satisfied are the enterprise's current lia-
bilities. From the relationship of current assets to current liabilities
is deduced the current ratio, one of the most significant signposts of
business finance. The cash advanced by customers or the inventory
converted therefrom, is a current asset; to fail, therefore, to treat as
a current liability the contract obligation which will consume this
asset, would permit the current ratio to reflect a false picture of the
1 Vandalia R. R. Co. v. Keys, 91 N. E. 173 (1939).
2 SAN.RS, HATFIELD, AND 'MooRE, A STATEMENT OF ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLE, (1938)
P3, in discussing credits to income, state: "Amounts received from customers in ad-
vance in the regular course of business are, strictly speaking, a mixture of liabilities and
profit. In so far as they call for merchandise or services to be rendered in the future,
the cost of such merchandise or services represents a liability. If such cost is a pre-
dominate elcment in the amount received in advance and if the merchandise or services
are to be rendered in the near future, there is much to be said for the general practice
of not attempting to segregate the profit element from the cost and of showing the whole
amount received as a current liability rather than as a deferred credit to income. If the
co t of the merchandise or services is only a small part of the amount received, the
whole of that amount may properly be shown as a credit to income rather than a current
liability." See also HOLMES, AUDITING PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURE (1939) 319; TAYLOR
AND MILLER, INTERMEDIATE ACCOUNTING (2d ed. 1938) 128; PATON, ACCOUNTANT'S HAND-
Boor (2d ed. 1933) 153, 837, 876.
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taxpayer's current financial position; consequently, the advances must
be classified as a specie of current liability.
However, it does not follow from this, as the dissenting judge
reasoned, that the theory of the statute is to gauge tax capacity from
the current ratio. Though properly a current liability, in the nor-
mal course of business the taxpayer's obligation will require, not
payment in money but rendition of service by the manufacture and
delivery of the machinery ordered; only upon failure to fulfill the ex-
pectations of the contract will there be a duty to return the monies to
the customer. Yet the statute speaks of items "payable on demand
or within one year," language which in legal and accounting circles
carries a connotation of payment in specie, rather than in service. 3
Contemporary writers advance the theory that legislative intent, in
any immediate sense, is a fiction, and that the most adequate solu-
tion to the problem of statutory interpretation seems therefore to lie
in adapting "the reasonable man" guide of other areas of the law.
4
The foundation for this theory is the belief that much of modern
legislation constitutes merely the sovereign declaration of private cus-
tom; consequently, legislative intent is to be found, if at all, in
crystallized social or business practice, especially in the case of spe-
cialized branches of legal control.5 In the principal case, certainly,
such an approach would deny to the taxpayer the deduction he
claimed, as one not within the intendment of the statute although
admittedly a current liability.
Concurring, Judge Turner did embrace this theory of statutory
intention to reach the correct result, but for a different reason.
Rather than emphasizing the second sentence of Sec. 5327, with its
requirement of payment on demand or within a year, the Judge found
the measure of possible deductions in the reference of the first sen-
tence to "current accounts payable."" Then, reviewing the account-
ing authorities, he concluded that the monies advanced to and held
3 1939 Atty. Gen. Opns. No. 345.4 jennings, Judicial Process at Its Worst (1937) 1 MoD. L. REV. 111; Horack, In the
Name of Legislative Intention (1932) 38 W. VA. L. Q. 119; GRAY, THE NATURE AND
SOURCES OF THE LAW (1921) 172-173; Radin, Statutory Interpretation (1930) 43 HARV.
L. REv. 863; Landis, A Note on "Statutory Interpretation" (1930) 43 id. 886.
5HORACK, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION (1940), 602.
6Tax Comm. v. Kelly-Springfield Tire Co., 38 Ohio App. 109, 175 N. E. 700 (1931).
It was held in this case that the old section, effective prior to 1933, allowed deductions
of all claims, demands and debts whatsoever. The present amendment limits the deduc-
tions permissible and requires that they be business accounts. The requirement that the
"items" be used in business has never been litigated before. It remains an open ques-
tion whether or not a judgment in tort would be classed as a current account payable.
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by the taxpayer were not properly to be considered as accounts pay-
able. In this he was without question correct ;7 to an accountant, an
account payable is limited to liabilities arising from the purchase of
goods or services used in the business. 8  But whether the statute's
first sentence carries the controlling definition is open to serious
doubt. Its phrases "current accounts receivable" and "current ac-
counts payable" are there used not definitionally but to convey the
legislative determination to permit of a taxable net value.9 Of what
"current accounts" consist is revealed by the language of the sec-
ond sentence-"items receivable or payable on demand or within
one year from the date of inception, however evidenced." If this
reading of the statute be correct, Judge Turner's conclusion would
unwarrantedly delimit the deductions covered by the taxing pro-
vision. Short-term bank notes, wages, rent, insurance, and sundry
other items, while not strictly current accounts payable, constitute
accrued expenses normally payable within a year if not on demand.'"
So also deposits held by utility companies as security for payment
of bills are not classified as current accounts payable but are never-
theless payable on demand upon discontinuance of the service by
the customer. By the prevailing opinion they should be deductible,
just as advances on future orders should not, despite the majority's
confusion over the proper reason for denying the claim made in the
principal case. C. K. M.
7 As to the interrelation of accounting and law see Kristeller, Some Problems Coin-
mon to the Practice of Law and Accounting, in Ohio State Univ. Pub. College of Com-
merce Conf. Ser., No. 7, 33 (1939).
2 BUD AND WPIGIT, TnE INTERPRETATION OF ACCOUNTS (1933) 340; Paton, op. cit.
spra note 2, at q39; BOLON AND ECELErRy, INTRODUCTION TO ACCOUNTING (2d ed.
1933) 13.
Supra, note 3.
'" HoLIES, op. cit. supra note 2, at 293.
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